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Abstract: 
One might wonder how two seemingly opposed concepts ended up in the same book 
title: epigenesis and rationality. One pertaining to biology, the other to philosophy, cog-
nitive and neurosciences; one describing a modality of change of the living, the other 
usually taken to be unchangeable, universal; one empiric, the other traditionally linked 
to the non-sensible; one describing the structuring influence of the environment on or-
ganisms, the other the supposed purity of thought. At stake in French philosopher Cat-
herine Malabou’s newest book (and her oeuvre more generally) is precisely this: trying 
to think the mutual in-formation of the real and the ideal, the empirical and the a priori, 
the material and the symbolic. 
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Malabou, Catherine: Avant demain. Épigenèse et rationalité. Presses Universitaires de France, 
Paris, 2014. 352 pages, 21 Euro. ISBN: 978-2-13-063045-6 
 
Malabou’s work is emerging as one of the most significant materialist philosophies of trans-
formation after post-structuralism and deconstruction. She has previously tackled these issues 
in her reading of Hegel and Heidegger; also in her approach to the neurosciences in confron-
tation with psychoanalysis. While the present book revolves around analogous philosophical 
concerns, she illuminates them from another angle: the battleground is now Kant’s notion of 
the transcendental, as confronted not only with its critics and interpreters (notably Heidegger 
and Foucault), but also with Quentin Milleseaux’s speculative realism on one hand and con-
temporary neurobiology and epigenetics on the other. 
Kant’s transcendental, aimed at overcoming both empiricism’s dangerous scepticism and ra-
tionalism’s equally dangerous idealism, is here confronted with its contemporary foes. The 
aim of this confrontation is no non-critical revival of his philosophy, even less its abandon-
ment: rather, as is customary for Malabou, her reading aims at wresting a philosophy of trans-
formation from within transcendental idealism itself. Showing its point of surface-contact with 
contemporary sciences of life, Malabou’s “epigenetic reading” demonstrates both the con-
temporary pertinence of a transcendental philosophy and the necessity of its confrontation 
with life sciences. Thereby it demonstrates both the legitimacy and necessity of a contempo-
rary continental philosophy of science. The transcendental and the question of its provenance 
opened by the “system of epigenesis of pure reason” in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason turns 
out to be fecund ground for the development of these concerns. For it is precisely the point 
of tension between the empirical and the ideal – the pure forms of intuition and the concepts 
of pure reason – which structure intuition and cognition yet have no inherent epistemic vali-
dity, no ontological reality without empirical intuition. The transcendental and the “system of 
its epigenesis” most explicitly open the question of the relation between subject and world 
and therefore of the nature of rationality: inborn or developed? A priori or a posteriori? 
Malabou’s book (in a deconstructive move) displaces the question of the origin of the 
transcendental (of its genesis) to thinking its point of emergence, its epicentre (its epigenesis): 
where can we find life shaping itself through its rational self-reflection, through making sense 
of itself? Precisely in the transcendental, the surface point of contact between subject and 
world, where the two reveal themselves to be inextricable. Abandoning it (as Milleseaux 
proposes) would entail abandoning both subject and world for a supposed radical alterity and 
the contingency of a completely other world, instead of thinking the immanent alterity or the 
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inherent transformability of both subject and world – of this world, as Malabou has always set 
out to do by thinking life’s own permanent self-mutation. 
Epigenetically reading the Critique of Pure Reason through the Critique of the Power of Jud-
gement, Malabou develops what I would propose calling a “materialist hermeneutics” of sub-
jectivity (which is of the world too): rethinking the notion of finality as a living being’s imma-
nent purposiveness or teleology, she reframes our common understandings of necessity, con-
tingency, and freedom and wrestles it from its mechanistic residues. Kant’s transcendental, in 
Malabou’s book, thus becomes an inherently malleable structure: “This suppleness is the con-
dition of the equilibrium of the system /.../ the transcendental is what assures both the stabi-
lity and the transformability of everything.” (317) 
Kant’s “system of pure reason,” far from rigidifying subjectivity into universal immutable struc-
tures, turns out to be a system whose immanent definition is its permanent malleability. In 
Malabou’s reading, Kant depicts a subject whose conditions of possibility of experience can 
neither be extricated nor reduced to experience; a subject who is part of a world, whose being 
cannot be reduced, nor yet extricated from its own making sense of itself: an epigenesis which 
is immanently rational (“spiritual” so to speak, or symbolic) and a rationality which is imman-
ently epigenetic, i.e. material. Malabou offers an undoubtedly Hegelian reading of Kant; yet it 
is a Hegel after poststructuralism and deconstruction’s critiques that will be found lingering 
silently in her newest book (and elsewhere). In any case, the urgency of a materialist thought 
of the symbolic and a hermeneutic grappling with the materiality of life emerges not only from 
contemporary philosophy’s several impasses after poststructuralism, but is at play also in our 
everyday self-understanding as reframed by contemporary cognitive and life sciences. 
Contemporary philosophy on the one hand risks foreclosing any thought of the subject (and 
its transcendental) by invoking an irrational a priori: prior to any subjectivity and prior to life 
itself. What follows is a radical contingency, which in the end turns out to be a disappointing 
necessity of the world’s actual facticity (as Malabou objects to Milleseaux), thus remaining 
blind to the non-eventual, gradual immanent transformability of life (251). The popularized 
reception of contemporary sciences of life (exemplified by Changeux’ Neuronal man) (263), 
on the other hand, risks enforcing a deterministic and positivistic understanding of subjecti-
vity, often deployed for normalizing ends. Some popularized readings – i.e., the neurosciences 
– would confront us with a picture of subjectivity reduced to bio-chemical processes, which in 
neuropathology ends up delinking mental disorders from their social milieu and from the sub-
ject’s own self-sense-making. Popular discourses on supposed male and female brains, cultu-
ral neurodiversity, etc. depict a deterministic understanding of the supposed inborn nature of 
rationality, as well as other character traits, always differentially allocated to scientifically 
grounded, existent power relations. Certain accounts of neuroplasticity offer us a model-me-
taphor for the supposed permanent malleability of the brain and subjectivity, an endless fle-
xibility without negativity, without exhaustion or lesion, which ground popular self-develop-
ment handbooks of the contemporary flexible labour force (as Malabou has pointed out else-
where, i.e. in What Should We Do With Our Brain? ) 
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Why do we urgently need a continental philosophy of (life) science(s)? Why do we need a 
materialist account of rationality? Why do we still need Kant? In lieu of the above-mentioned 
context, Malabou’s relentless search for the symbolic in the material, the subjective in the 
objective, the contingent within the necessary, and the mutability of the structural/systemic 
gives a clear answer, which includes philosophical, scientific, and implicitly political reasons. 
As she argues, the time has come for a philosophy of epigenetics, for a thinking of the inextri-
cability of the a priori and the a posteriori, as well as of the material and the symbolic, of 
subject and world. Or rather, to return to the book’s title: given the dominant philosophical 
and (popularized) scientific context, the temporality of such an endeavour exemplified by Ma-
labou’s book is (in Nietzsche’s sense) untimely: before tomorrow. 
